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The Chiquita and Van Parys Judgments:
Rules, Exceptions and the Law
By Antonis Antoniadis*
1. Introduction
The judgments in Chiquita1 and Van Parys2 are poised between the jurispru-
dence constante denying direct effect to the WTO Agreement3 and proposals
furnished by the academic community4 and Advocates General5 to broaden
the scope of the so-called Nakajima doctrine6 which provides an exception
from the general prohibition. Essentially, the suggestion was that the Court7
should give effect to Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) recommendations identi-
fying the incompatibility of Community legislation with the WTO Agreement
* Lecturer in Law, University of Durham and Durham European Law Institute.
1. Case T-19/01 Chiquita Brands International, Inc., Chiquita Banana Co. BV and Chiquita Italia,
SpA v. Commission of the European Communities, judgment of 3 February 2005, not yet reported.
2. Case C-377/02 Léon Van Parys NV v. Belgisch Interventie- en Restitutiebureau (BIRB), judgment
of 1 March 2005, not yet reported.
3. The term ‘WTO Agreement’ may be used generically to include both the WTO Agreement and
the covered agreements.
4. N. Lavranos, ‘The Chiquita and Van Parys judgments: An exception to the rule of law’, in this
issue; N. Lavranos, Decisions of International Organizations in the European and Domestic Legal
Orders of Selected EU Member States, (Europea Law Publishing, 2004); G. A. Zonnekeyn, ‘The
Status of Adopted Panel and Appellate Body Reports in the European Court of Justice and the
European Court of First Instance – The Banana Experience’ (2000) 34 Journal of World Trade
93; G. A. Zonnekeyn, ‘The Bed Linen Case and its Aftermath: Some Comments on the Euro-
pean Community’s “World Trade Organization Enabling Regulation”’ (2002) 36 Journal of
World Trade 993; P. Eeckhout, ‘Judicial Enforcement of WTO Law in the European Union –
Some Further Reflections’ (2002) 5 Journal of International Economic Law 91; P. Mengozzi, ‘Le
Relazioni Esterne della Communità Europea, il Principio di Sussidiarietà e le Esigenze de
Cooperazione Poste dalla Globalizzazione dell’ Economia’ in L. Daniele (ed.), Le Relazioni
Esterne della Unione European Nel Nuovo Millennio, (Giuffre Milano, 2001) p. 5.
5. Opinion of AG Alber in Case C-93/02 P Biret International SA & Etablissements Biret et Sie
[2003] ECR I-10497; Opinion of AG Tizzano in Case C-377/02 Léon Van Parys NV v. Belgisch
Interventie- en Restitutiebureau (BIRB), judgment of 1 March 2005, not yet reported, on the
specific issue of WTO DSB recommendations. For the more general calls for direct effect see,
Opinion of AG Tesauro in Case C-53/96 Hermès International v. FHT Marketing Choice BV
[1998] ECR I-3603; Opinion of AG Cosmas in C-183/95 Affish v. Rijksdienst voor de keuring
van Vee en Vlees [1997] ECR I-4315; Opinion of AG Saggio in Case C-149/96 Portugal v.
Council [1999] ECR I-8395.
6. Case C-69/89 Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd v. Council [1991] ECR I-2069.
7. The term ‘Court’ will be used generically for both Community courts.
Legal Issues of Economic Integration 32(4): 460–476, 2005.
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and review the legality of Community acts under WTO law. Both judgments,
properly construed, must lead to the conclusion that the Court followed the
strict line dating back to International Fruit8 denying direct effect lato sensu to
WTO law, elaborated its previous case-law and dispelled any expectations
raised by the judgment-aberration in Biret.9 The Court has attracted criticism
for its position denying direct effect to WTO law and one would expect, in the
light of the unequivocal character of the judgments under review, that criti-
cism is destined to continue and probably intensify.10 This article aims to
argue in favour of the Court and contribute to the explanation of the legal and
political considerations justifying its position.11 At the same time, it will at-
tempt to surmise the misunderstandings that gave way to the criticism against
the Court and argue against some of the newly-cast polemic thrown at the
Court.
2. The Chiquita Judgment
The facts of this case are well known. Chiquita brought the case before the
Court of First Instance (CFI) and requested compensation from the Commis-
sion for the loss it allegedly suffered as a result of the latter’s adoption and
maintaining in force of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2362/98 regarding
imports of bananas into the Community.12 Its claim was not based on the
argument of direct effect of WTO law, bound to fail in the light of the Court’s
case-law, but on the Nakajima exception under which the Court may review
the legality of Community acts under WTO law when the Community in-
tended to implement a particular obligation assumed in the context of the
WTO.13
The applicants in this case shifted their rhetoric outside direct effect and
8. Joined Cases 21–24/72 International Fruit Company v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit
[1972] ECR 1219.
9. Cases C-93/02 & 94/02 Biret International SA & Etablissements Biret et Sie [2003] ECR I-10497
& 10565 at paragraphs 62–64 & 65–67 respectively.
10. Lavranos characterises the Court’s attitude as ‘disturbing’, supra note 4.
11. A. Rosas, ‘Annotation of Case C-149/96 Portugal v. Council’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law
Review 797; F. Snyder, ‘The Gatekeepers: The European Courts and WTO Law’ (2003) 40
Common Market Law Review 313; Eeckhout, supra note 4; A. Antoniadis, ‘The Participation of
the European Community in the World Trade Organisation: An External Look at European
Union Constitution-Building’ in T. Tridimas & P. Nebbia (eds.), EU Law for the 21st Century:
Rethinking the New Legal Order, Vol. I (Hart Publishing, 2004), p. 321.
12. Referred to throughout the judgment as ‘the 1999 regime’.
13. Case T-19/01 Chiquita Brands International, Inc., Chiquita Banana Co. BV and Chiquita Italia,
SpA v. Commission of the European Communities, judgment of 3 February 2005, not yet reported,
at paragraphs 83–84.
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focussed instead on implementation – or the intention thereto – of WTO
obligations and effective judicial protection.14 Focussing on the first limb, they
attempted, rather unconvincingly, to argue that the conditions of the specific
case permitted the interpretation of the Nakajima doctrine in such a manner as
to vindicate their claim.15 The Commission rejected Chiquita’s arguments by
recalling the ruling from Atlanta that DSB recommendations could only be
taken into account if the underlying obligation were found to have direct
effect16 and that the Nakajima conditions were not fulfilled in this case.17
The CFI stated that having regard to their nature and general scheme, the
WTO agreement and its annexes are not, in principle, among the rules in the
light of which the Court will review the legality of acts of the Community
institutions and that they do not create in favour of individuals rights which
they may use before a court by virtue of Community law.18 It went on to spell
out the Nakajima and Fediol exceptions,19 and analyse the scope of the
Nakajima exception identified by the Court as the only ground in the
applicant’s case.20 Making a brief analysis of the previous case-law the Court
found that the exception gives an opportunity to private parties not gaining
rights by virtue of the Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA) to launch an indirect
challenge against the Community basic regulation for violation of the ADA.
As an exceptional rule, it must be interpreted strictly and on the basis of the
previous case-law has only been upheld twice by the Community courts.21
Had the CFI stopped there it would have been an unproblematic decision.
However, obviously influenced by the Court’s reprimand in Biret to provide a
fuller analysis of the impact of DSB recommendations at the determination of
infringement of the SPS Agreement in that case,22 the CFI went on to enter-
tain further findings. While this contribution is primarily concerned with the
broader considerations of the judgment, a brief comment on these related
findings is appropriate. The CFI attempted to second-guess the Court’s rea-
soning behind the exception provided in the Nakajima case by construing in
Articles 16(6)(a) of the 1979 Anti-Dumping Code23 and Article 18(4) of the
14. Ibid. at paragraphs 86–88.
15. Ibid. at paragraphs 86–103.
16. Ibid. at paragraph 104.
17. Ibid. at paragraphs 105–113.
18. Ibid. at paragraph 114 referring to the Portugal v. Council and Dior judgments respectively.
19. Ibid. at paragraph 115.
20. Ibid. at paragraph 116.
21. Case C-76/00 P Petrotub SA and Republica SA v. Council and Commission [2003] ECR I-79 at
paragraph 52 et seq and Case T-256/97 BEUC v. Commission [2000] ECR II-101 at paragraph
52 et seq.
22. Case C-93/02 Biret International SA [2003] ECR I-10497 at paragraph 56.
23. ‘contracting parties … take all necessary steps, of general or particular character, to ensure, not
later than the date of entry into force of this Agreement for it, the conformity of its law,
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1994 Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA) an obligation to transpose the provi-
sions of these Codes into Community law.24 The CFI here failed to acknowl-
edge Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement which states that ‘Each Member
shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative proce-
dures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements’. The obliga-
tion to conform with the WTO agreements is general and not unique in the
ADA. This obligation however does not entail the obligation to transpose the
provisions of the WTO agreements in Community law as the CFI suggests.25
From this erroneous premise the CFI went on to explain that the Nakajima
doctrine is not limited only to the cases of anti-dumping but may extend to
other areas.26 On this basis it went on to analyse the specifics of the current
case under the Nakajima principles and arrive at the conclusion that there was
no intention to implement a particular obligation assumed in the context of
the WTO.27 This is because Article XIII GATT and Articles II and XVII
GATS lay down principles and obligations which by their wording, nature and
scope are general in character compared to those in the 1979 and 1994 Anti-
Dumping Codes.28 Because of the general nature of the provisions, the DSB
recommendations to bring the Community legislation into conformity there-
with are also in the CFI’s view general and cannot therefore be relied upon for
the purposes of the Nakajima doctrine.29
While the statement that the WTO dispute settlement system ‘…does not
establish a mechanism for the judicial resolution of international disputes by
means of decisions with binding effects comparable with those of a court
decision in the internal legal systems of the Member States’30 can only be
accused of simplicity unbecoming the complexity of the subject, the elusive
attempt to accommodate the Atlanta ruling with the Biret reprimand is
complemented by an even more contentious statement. The CFI essentially
implies that the Community could be held liable under Article 288 EC Treaty
for the period after the deadline for implementation under Article 21(3)(c)
DSU has passed and until full compliance is achieved subject to not having
paid compensation or suffered retaliation.31 Thereby, the CFI tried to limit the
regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of this Agreement as they may
apply for the Party in question’.
24. Case T-19/01 Chiquita Brands International, Inc., Chiquita Banana Co. BV and Chiquita Italia,
SpA v. Commission of the European Communities, judgment of 3 February 2005, not yet reported,
at paragraph 121.
25. Ibid. at paragraph 122. This is analysed in more detail below.
26. Ibid. at paragraph 124.
27. Ibid. at paragraph 157.
28. Ibid. at paragraph 159.
29. Ibid. at paragraph 161.
30. Ibid. at paragraph 162.
31. Ibid. at paragraph 166.
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potential scope of the remarkable Biret judgment with an equally remarkable
legal construction of alternating public/private dues. Leaving this statement
behind as an obiter, the CFI returned to its analysis of the Nakajima doctrine
in the present case to conclude that there are no special obligations which the
Community intended to implement and that, as the Community did not
transpose any of those, Chiquita could not plead the infringement by the
Community of its obligations under the WTO Agreement.32
3. The Van Parys Judgment
The Court of Justice delivered its judgment in Van Parys33 a couple of weeks
after the CFI judgment in Chiquita. The case arrived at the Court on a request
for a preliminary ruling concerning the validity of the Community’s bananas
import regime and arose when Van Parys, a Belgian bananas importer, was
refused an import licence for certain quantities of bananas originating in Ecua-
dor and Panama by the Belgian Intervention and Refund Board (BIRB).34
Advocate General Tizzano35 in his Opinion made an overview of the case-
law focussing in particular on Portugal v. Council36 and Netherlands v. Parlia-
ment and Council37 where the Court had made clear that the WTO Agree-
ments can neither be invoked by individuals in national courts nor serve as the
standard for review.38 He then made an appraisal of the impact that an adverse
ruling adopted by the DSB may have by reference to the operation of the
DSB. He then unreservedly endorsed39 the arguments made by Advocate Gen-
eral Alber in Biret and sent a message to the Court that ‘in a Community by
law DSB decisions must be considered as a criterion of the legality of Commu-
nity measures and that the Court consequently should not, on grounds of
doubtful legal merit, give clear approval to legal arguments that would lead to
the opposite conclusion’.40 Going onto the judgment in Biret, he condoned
the temporal limitation to direct effect of DSB recommendations until the end
of the reasonable time for compliance set by Article 21.3 DSU.41 At the same
time he read in the Court’s criticism of the CFI for not examining the possible
32. Ibid. at paragraphs 167–170.
33. Case C-377/02 Léon Van Parys NV v. Belgisch Interventie- en Restitutiebureau (BIRB), judgment
of 1 March 2005, not yet reported.
34. Ibid. at paragraphs 31–36.
35. Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in Van Parys, delivered on 18 November 2004.
36. Case C-149/96 Portugal v. Council [1999] ECR I-8395.
37. Case C-377/98 Netherlands v. Parliament and Council [2001] ECR I-7079.
38. Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in Van Parys at paragraphs 36–45.
39. Ibid. at paragraphs 63–73.
40. Ibid. at paragraph 73.
41. Ibid. at footnote 52.
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impact of DSB recommendations on the argument over direct effect that,
indeed, in the presence of DSB recommendations there may be room for a
different answer to the question of direct effect.42 Curiously, Advocate General
Tizzano leaped to the conclusion that ‘the Community regime for the import
of bananas based on Regulation No 404/93 as amended and on the regulations
adopted to implement that regulation is invalid inasmuch as it is inconsistent
with the WTO rules as established by the DSB on 25 September 1997 and
confirmed by the same body on 6 May 1999’ without any further explana-
tion.43
Faithful to its long line of jurisprudence the Court explained that the
WTO agreements cannot in principle be invoked by individuals and enable
the Court to exercise judicial review of the relevant Community provisions in
the light of those rules.44 Only when the Community intended to implement
a particular obligation or where a Community measure refers expressly to the
precise provisions of the WTO Agreements the Court may review the legality
of the Community measure in the light of WTO rules.45 The Community did
not intend to implement a particular obligation in this sense by amending its
bananas import regime.46 Instead, the Court treated the inconsistency estab-
lished by the DSB of the Common Market Organisation in Bananas with
Articles I and XIII GATT as simply a step in a procedure fully prescribed in
the DSU.47 Had it not been for the denial of direct effect, the legislative and
executive organs of the WTO Members could not have taken advantage of the
possibility afforded to them by Article 22 DSU in order to reach a negotiated
settlement.48 Offering a procedural overview of the bananas dispute, the Court
praised the institutions for exhausting the possibilities under the DSU and
achieving an agreement compatible with WTO rules, the Community’s obli-
gations towards ACP states and the objectives of the Common Agricultural
Policy.49 The Court could have further elaborated on certain procedural as-
pects of the bananas dispute which strengthen its argument concerning
the availability of options to the Community under WTO rules.50 According-
ly, the Community was granted a waiver from its obligations under Article
XIII:1 and 2 of the GATT by the Doha Ministerial Conference to maintain
the transitional regime, agreed between the EC, the US and Ecuador, until
42. Ibid. at paragraphs 76–78.
43. Ibid. at paragraph 83.
44. Case C-377/02 Léon Van Parys NV v. Belgisch Interventie- en Restitutiebureau (BIRB), judgment
of 1 March 2005, not yet reported, at paragraph 39.
45. Ibid. at paragraph 40.
46. Ibid. at paragraph 41.
47. Ibid. at paragraphs 42–47.
48. Ibid. at paragraph 48.
49. Ibid. at paragraphs 49–50.
50. It is hardly a surprise that it is ignored by the Court’s critics.
The Chiquita and Van Parys Judgments: Rules, Exceptions and the Law
467
31 December 2005.51 Despite however, the agreement reached with US and
Ecuador52 and the waiver obtained, it must be noted that both countries
objected to the removal of the dispute from the DSB agenda.53 In their view,
this agreement does not qualify as a mutually agreed solution that would bring
the dispute to an end.54 The dispute remains on the DSB agenda and, conse-
quently, under the multilateral surveillance established by the DSU.55 One
cannot therefore contend, for the purposes of direct effect, that the DSU
process is over.
Returning back to the judgment, it culminates in paragraph 51 where the
Court dismisses the importance of the expiry of the time-limit under Article
21.3(c) DSU, overruling thereby both Biret and Chiquita to the extent identi-
fied above, and takes a stance which is both reprimanding and didactic: ‘In
those circumstances, to require the Community Court, merely on the basis that
that time-limit has expired, to review the lawfulness of the Community mea-
sures concerned in the light of the WTO rules, could have the effect of under-
mining the Community’s position in its attempt to reach a mutually accept-
able solution to the dispute in conformity with those rules’.56 This part of the
judgment is a revelation. It is made obvious that the autonomy of the institu-
tions and the principle of reciprocity are not the only reasons – important as
they are – for denying direct effect. Read together with the last sentence of
paragraph 53 ‘Such lack of reciprocity, if admitted, would risk introducing an
anomaly in the application of the WTO rules’57 restate the Court’s unequivo-
cal belief that denial of direct effect is not only in the interest of the Commu-
nity but, more importantly, in the interest of the WTO and the proper inter-
pretation and application of its rules.58 The strictness of the tone reflects the
strictness of its position and signals to all directions that the Court will not
waver despite pressure.
51. European Communities – Transitional Regime for the EC autonomous tariff rate quotas on imports
of bananas, Decision of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/16, Ministerial Conference, Fourth
Session, Doha, 9–14 November 2001.
52. Case C-377/02 Léon Van Parys NV v. Belgisch Interventie- en Restitutiebureau (BIRB), judgment
of 1 March 2005, not yet reported, at paragraph 49, last indent.
53. Update of WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, WT/DS/OV/23, 15 June 2005, at p. 198.
54. Notified to the DSB under Article 3(6) DSU.
55. Case C-377/02 Léon Van Parys NV v. Belgisch Interventie- en Restitutiebureau (BIRB), judgment
of 1 March 2005, not yet reported, at paragraph 46.
56. Emphasis added.
57. In less peremptory terms, Case C-149/96 Portugal v. Council [1999] ECR I-8395 at paragraph
45.
58. Rosas supra note 11 and Eeckhout supra note 4 offer an outstanding selection of arguments in
this line of reasoning.
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4. Comment
The question presented to the Court is effectively summarised in Van Parys:
whether the WTO agreements give Community nationals a right to rely on
those agreements in legal proceedings challenging the validity of Community
legislation where the DSB has held that both that legislation and subsequent
legislation adopted by the Community in order, inter alia, to comply with the
relevant WTO rules are incompatible with those rules.59 Essentially, two ques-
tions can be identified: whether WTO law can be directly effective and
whether the long-standing negative answer to the question is affected by the
existence of DSB recommendations declaring the incompatibility of Commu-
nity legislation with the WTO agreements.
The Court has been accused of playing a political role in the significant
issue of determining the effect the WTO Agreement was intended to have in
the internal legal orders of the Community and its Member States.60 This is an
easily rebuttable accusation simply because the Court’s answer would have
been perceived as politically influenced owing to the wide discretion held at
deciding an issue of admittedly constitutional importance.61 However, given
the last preambular clause in the Council Decision concluding the WTO
Agreement,62 it is the granting of direct effect that would have been treated as
jurisprudential policy-making rather than a statement to the opposite effect.63
The analysis of the Court, however, has always been purely legal. The
Court, as is customary for ‘national’ courts in international law, reserved for
itself the right to interpret, in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty and in the light of the nature and purpose of
the obligations undertaken by the Community, whether an international
agreement can be directly effective in the Community legal order.64 Insofar as
the WTO Agreement is concerned, in the seminal judgment of Portugal, the
59. Case C-377/02 Léon Van Parys NV v. Belgisch Interventie- en Restitutiebureau (BIRB), judgment
of 1 March 2005, not yet reported, at paragraph 38.
60. J. Klabbers, ‘International Law in Community Law: The Law and Politics of Direct Effect’
(2002) 21 Yearbook of European Law 263 at p. 298.
61. Eeckhout, supra note 4 at p. 96.
62. Council Decision 94/800/EC of 22 December 1994 concerning the conclusion on behalf of the
European Community, as regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in
the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations (1986–1994), O.J. L336, 23.12.1994, p. 1.
63. See also, Joel Trachtman, ‘Bananas, direct effect and compliance’ (1999) 10 European Journal of
International Law 655 at p. 664.
64. Article 31(1) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; see generally, R. Higgins, ‘Integrations
of Authority and Control’ in M. S. McDougal, M. W. Reisman & B. H. Weston (eds.), Toward
World Order and Human Dignity: Essay in Honor of Myers S. McDougal, (Free Press, New York,
1976) p. 76 at 85.
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Court started its analysis from the intention of the parties.65 Taking into
account the presumed intention of the Community and its Member States to
perform in good faith the obligations undertaken under the WTO Agree-
ment,66 the question emerged, in the absence of clear guidance in this respect,
whether the judicial enforcement of the WTO Agreement in the Community
and Member States legal orders will facilitate the fulfilment of the Community
and Member States’ obligations thereunder.
Unlike the new legal order established by the EC Treaty which ‘… not
only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon
them rights which become part of their legal heritage’,67 the WTO Agreement
is a paradigm of international organisation in the traditional sense.68 From this
perspective, individuals are extremely handicapped.69 Accordingly, the context
of the WTO Agreement is conducive to the interpretation that this is a system
based on traditional international law whose actors are states and rights and
obligations prescribed therein are owned by states. In order to rebut such
presumption evidence must be sought in the WTO Agreement offering power-
ful indication to the contrary.
From a systemic perspective, it must be pointed out that the Uruguay
Round results have been treated as a single undertaking to include not only the
substantive obligations included in Annex 1 but also the dispute settlement
rules enshrined in Annex 2.70 In this vein, it has been argued that it is the
radical alteration of the dispute settlement brought by the DSU that differen-
tiates between GATT 1947 and the WTO Agreement and necessitates direct
effect.71 In essence, it is the nature of the dispute settlement system established
by the DSU that determines whether the WTO Agreement should be directly
effective.
The nature of the WTO dispute settlement system is to provide security
and predictability to the multilateral trading system, to preserve the rights and
obligations under the covered agreements and clarify the existing provisions of
those agreements.72 The nationality-of-claims rule, stemming from traditional
international law,73 is central in the construction of WTO dispute settlement.
65. Case C-149/96 Portugal v. Council [1999] ECR I-8395 at paragraph 34.
66. Ibid. at paragraph 35. This must also be taken as sufficiently strong argument in order to rebut
the claim that there is violation of the pacta sunt servanda principle.
67. Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 3
68. Panel Report on United States – Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, adopted on 22
December 1999, WT/DS152/R, para. 7.72.
69. R. Higgins, Problems & Process: International Law and how we use it, (OUP, 1994) at p. 51.
70. The single package deal of the WTO agreements is also evidenced by the possibility for cross-
retaliation. See further, Rosas, supra note 11 at p. 810.
71. Case C-149/96 Portugal v. Council [1999] ECR I-8395 at paragraph 31.
72. Article 3(2) DSU.
73. Higgins, supra note 69 at p. 51.
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If a state considers that benefits accruing from the covered agreements are
nullified or impaired, that state may bring a matter before WTO dispute
settlement against another state, in many cases in order to resolve an essentially
private commercial dispute.74 The objective is a mutually acceptable resolution
of the dispute75 and the mechanisms available under the DSU include good
offices, mediation, conciliation and the ordinary panel and Appellate Body
process.76 Should the Panel and Appellate Body conclude that a measure is
inconsistent with a covered agreement, they shall recommend that the state
concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement.77 Prompt
compliance is required78 which ordinarily consists into the withdrawal of the
measure.79 Pending full implementation, the full breadth of options, available
on an, admittedly, temporary basis, can be employed.80
There are two strands of reasoning stemming from this procedural over-
view of the mechanisms to achieve compliance under the multilateral surveil-
lance system established by the DSU which form a DNA-shaped helix: the
first strand forms the procedural constraints imposed by the DSU on the
Court’s assessment of whether judicial enforcement of the WTO Agreement in
the Community shall facilitate the fulfilment of the Community’s obligations.
The single undertaking assumption mentioned above necessitates that the
Community observes not only the substantive but the procedural obligations
under the covered agreements. The direct effect would frustrate all options,
albeit temporary, provided by the DSU. Is the ex tunc annulment of a Com-
munity measure resulting from the judicial review by Community courts be-
cause of inconsistency with the substantive WTO rules in conformity with the
procedural WTO rules enshrined in the DSU? The answer is in the negative
because this would both render Articles 21 and 22 redundant and compromise
the prospective nature of remedies under the DSU.81 It is not only the Com-
munity institutional balance that is upset and which the Court sought to
protect,82 but also the proper operation of the WTO rules, as can be inferred
from the didactic tone in the Court reasoning.83
Moving on to the second strand, in an almost circular operation of the
74. The involvement of the US in the Bananas dispute in support of Chiquita is revealing. A recent
eminent example is the recent Boeing/Airbus dispute.
75. Article 3(7) DSU.
76. Articles 5 et seq. DSU.
77. Hardly has there been any ‘ruling’ in the sense of Article 19(1) second sentence DSU.
78. Article 21(1) DSU.
79. Article 3(7) DSU.
80. Rosas, supra note 11 at p. 811.
81. Eeckhout, supra note 4 at p. 94.
82. Case C-149/96 Portugal v. Council [1999] ECR I-8395 at paragraph 40.
83. Case C-377/02 Léon Van Parys NV v. Belgisch Interventie- en Restitutiebureau (BIRB), judgment
of 1 March 2005, not yet reported, at paragraph 51.
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helix, the question of individual rights is re-raised. Does the analysis of the
DSU indicate that there are rights granted to individuals? It must be restated
that since the multilateral trading system is predominantly state-based, unless
WTO members have in no unclear terms indicated their intention to grant
rights to individuals or provide an alternative/complementary to the DSU
method of compliance including judicial review, such measures should be
deemed to escape the scrutiny of national and Community courts. The system
of compensation and suspension of concessions under Article 22 DSU pro-
vides support in the opposite direction. Taking into account that it is the state
that has suffered damages because of the violation of provisions of the WTO
Agreement by another state, it has the right to seek retribution in a compensa-
tion offer or authorisation to retaliate, pending full compliance by the default-
ing state. Apart from the understanding that the right to retaliate is owned by
the state, the argument that individuals may draw rights from a state’s viola-
tion of the WTO Agreement could generate implausible results. Had the
applicant’s claim been upheld in Chiquita, the Community would have been
subject to damages originating in the same conduct both in the WTO (the US
retaliation) and Community (Chiquita’s claim for damages) legal orders. As
the Commission convincingly argued, after the offer of compensation or the
application retaliation the overall balance of concessions is re-established.84
The absence of retaliation by the state however, should in no way be construed
to surrender this right to private parties as the CFI seems to suggest.85 For the
reasons already identified by the Court in International Fruit86 which, it is
submitted, are reinforced and not overturned by the adoption of the DSU, the
WTO Agreement must not have direct effect in the Community and Member
States legal orders.
Having explained that the first question raised by the Court in Van Parys is
answered in the negative, does the fact that the Community adopted measures
to comply with DSB recommendations and which have been declared incon-
sistent with the covered agreements overturn this finding? In principle, this
does not seem to be the case as DSB recommendations only clarify the existing
provisions without creating new legal obligations for WTO members; they
form part of the agreements annexed to the WTO rather than separate deci-
sions.87 Therefore, the direct effect analysis applies to those too. That said, can
DSB recommendations fall within the Nakajima exception proposed by com-
84. T-19/01 Chiquita Brands International, Inc., Chiquita Banana Co. BV and Chiquita Italia, SpA v.
Commission of the European Communities, judgment of 3 February 2005, not yet reported, at
paragraph 153.
85. Ibid. at paragraph 166.
86. Joined Cases 21–24/72 International Fruit Company v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit
[1972] ECR 1219 at paragraph 21.
87. Lavranos, supra note 4 at pp. 132, 140; Zonnekeyn, supra note 4 at p. 98.
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mentators?88 One must first examine the scope of the Nakajima exception.
Starting the analysis from the original judgment some observations must be
made. The Court held in Nakajima that the indirect review of secondary
Community legislation against otherwise non-directly effective GATT law can
take place when a measure was adopted in order to comply with the interna-
tional obligations of the Community.89 Ever since Portugal however, the word-
ing of the Nakajima exception has changed into ‘where the Community in-
tended to implement a particular obligation’.90 Different wordings seem to
suggest totally different outcomes. The wording of post-WTO case-law, prop-
erly construed, indicates that in the implementation exception the Court does
not apply WTO law qua WTO law but qua Community law. In Petrotub,91 a
case concerning the imposition of anti-dumping duties on imports of certain
seamless pipes and tubes of iron or non-alloy steel originating in Romania, the
Court explained that since the Community pursuant to the Basic Anti-Dump-
ing Regulation intended to transpose the ADA, the Court may review the
legality of Community measures in the field of anti-dumping under the ADA.
The Court went further to explain that those rules being subsumed within the
Community legal system attract the application of an additional layer of pro-
tection prescribed by this system, in that case Article 253 EC Treaty and the
obligation to provide reasons.92 The implication is that the ADA provisions in
question shall be treated qua Community law. The communitarization of the
ADA by virtue of its transposition had the consequence in the post-WTO era
that it attracts the application of the principles and qualities of Community
law. This, under its own conditions, includes direct effect.
Does Community legislation intending to implement the DSB recommen-
dations generate direct effect? Plausible as it may be, this argument is not
without its difficulties. Article 3(2) DSU explicitly states that ‘recommenda-
tions and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obliga-
tions provided in the covered agreements’. The assumption that there is a
particular obligation to implement stemming from DSB recommendations
runs counter to this provision. It is more convincing to argue that legislative
activity to comply simply forms part of the general obligation towards prompt
compliance under Article 21(1) DSU and the even more general obligation
enshrined in Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement, informing the entire
Agreement and stating that ‘Each Member shall ensure the conformity of its
laws, regulations and administrative provisions with its obligations as provided
88. Inter alia, read the remarkably lucid analysis by Eeckhout, supra note 4.
89. Case C-69/89 Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd v. Council [1991] ECR I-2069 at paragraph 31.
90. Case C-149/96 Portugal v. Council [1999] ECR I-8395 at paragraph 49.
91. Case C-76/00P Petrotub SA and Republica SA v. Council and Commission [2003] ECR I-79 at
paras. 54–60.
92. Ibid. at paragraph 58.
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in the annexed Agreements’. This general obligation should be presumed in
the legislative intent of the Community anyway. Were the proposed interpre-
tation to be accepted it would have rendered the entire Community legislation
subject to judicial review under the WTO Agreement.
The judgments under review are in contrast regarding the last proposition.
It is inherent in the Court’s reasoning in Van Parys that it accepts that there is
no particular obligation to implement.93 The CFI by contrast went on to
analyse the substantive GATT and GATS obligations that, in its view, the
Community intended to implement under the Nakajima doctrine94 and found
that because they are general in nature they cannot be relied upon under the
Nakajima case-law.95 With respect, it is difficult to agree with the reasoning of
the CFI. As mentioned above, the CFI simply attempted to follow the signal
sent by the Court of Justice in Biret. This thesis viewed generally, when the
Community attempts to comply with DSB recommendations it risks being
construed as having the intention to implement the substantive rules violated.
This clearly cannot be the case for many reasons, including the fact that few
provisions in WTO law have similar characteristics to the ADA and are there-
fore prone to direct effect. Importantly however it should also be considered
irresponsible, by the most lenient of assessments, to integrate disparate and
unsystematic WTO rules into the Community legal order.
Given that the integration of substantive WTO provisions should be
deemed missing from the legislative intent of the Community, if it were to be
assumed, contrary to what the Court has held in Van Parys, that the obligation
to comply with an adverse ruling constitutes a particular obligation from a
procedural perspective, what would the modalities for the application of the
Nakajima doctrine be? Even if DSB recommendations can be read to include
a particular obligation incumbent on the Community, they would only pro-
vide a standard for the review of subsequent Community acts against the
assumed obligation and, unlike Petrotub, would confer no rights on individu-
als. Under well established case-law, the resultant unlawfulness of the Commu-
nity conduct will only generate Community liability if a sufficiently serious
breach of a rule of law designed to confer rights on individuals is established.96
For the reasons analysed above there are no rights conferred on individuals by
WTO law and consequently, the application of the Nakajima doctrine in
93. Case C-377/02 Léon Van Parys NV v. Belgisch Interventie- en Restitutiebureau (BIRB), judgment
of 1 March 2005, not yet reported, at paragraph 52.
94. T-19/01 Chiquita Brands International, Inc., Chiquita Banana Co. BV and Chiquita Italia, SpA v.
Commission of the European Communities, judgment of 3 February 2005, not yet reported, at
paragraph 127.
95. Ibid. at paragraphs 159–161.
96. Case C-352/98 P Bergaderm and Goupil v. Commission [2000] ECR I-5291 at paragraphs 40 and
42–44; Case C-312/00 P Commission v. Camar and Tico [2002] ECR I-11355 at paragraphs 52–
55; Case C472/00 P Commission v. Fresh Marine [2003] ECR I-7541 at paragraphs 24–26.
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Community liability cases will be fruitless. In sum, it should be conceded that
the Nakajima doctrine is difficult to apply outside circumstances that in-
formed its genesis. The Court has been correct in Van Parys not to entertain
this claim.
The analysis provided so far has been predominantly based on the interpre-
tation of the WTO agreements. It should be mentioned that subsequent prac-
tice in the application of the WTO agreements97 confirms the Court’s inter-
pretation. The denial of direct effect to the WTO agreements by major
jurisdictions, most importantly the US and Japan, confirms what is clear from
the text and context of the WTO agreements that they do not confer rights on
individuals. The non-conferral of direct effect by the most important jurisdic-
tions does not only serve the principle of reciprocity but also provides guid-
ance, from an international law perspective, towards the correct interpretation
of the WTO Agreement.
As a result, the claim that the denial of direct effect is in breach of the
principle of pacta sunt servanda does not stand to serious criticism. The scope
of the obligation enshrined in this principle is that every treaty is binding upon
the parties to it and must be performed by it in good faith.98 The Community
did nothing more than use the avenues available to it under the DSU in order
to comply with its obligations. The recognition of direct effect of the WTO
Agreement and/or DSB recommendations would have precluded the Commu-
nity from doing so. This would have frustrated the provisions of the WTO
Agreement and in particular those of the DSU.
The argument that there is a violation of fundamental rights inherent in
the denial of direct effect is puzzling. In fact, the position of the Court of
Justice towards WTO law is roughly comparable with the position in English
law regarding the European Convention on Human Rights prior to the adop-
tion of the 1998 Human Rights Acts. Until then, the ECHR gave no cause of
action in the English Courts let alone the rulings of the ECtHR.99 By analogy,
it is difficult to argue that there is a fundamental right, namely the right of
effective judicial protection enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, violated. The CFI explained that the fact that
the applicant has been in a position to use the legal means at its disposal means
that there is no infringement of the principle of effective judicial protection.100
97. Article 31(3)(c) Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties.
98. Article 26 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
99. H. Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, 3rd edition, (Cavendish Publishing, 2002),
Chapters 2 and 3 especially at pp. 112–115 where the author points out judicially constructed
exceptions similar to those provided by the Court of Justice.
100. T-19/01 Chiquita Brands International, Inc., Chiquita Banana Co. BV and Chiquita Italia, SpA
v. Commission of the European Communities, judgment of 3 February 2005, not yet reported, at
paragraph 259.
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In the light of the recent Bosphorous judgment rendered by the ECtHR the
opposite argument appears unconvincing.101
5. Conclusions
There is a tendency in literature, not unsupported by some contradictions in
the historical development of the Court’s case-law, to entertain a commu-
nitarised treatment of WTO law and show little resistance to the lure of direct
effect. This position indicates a preference towards a specific approach towards
the broader considerations raised by the relationship between interconnecting
legal orders, in particular those endowed with some system of dispute
settlement. The proliferation of legal orders is marking the development of
international law and compartmentalisation must be seen as an unwelcome
consequence. Striking the right balance between integration and compart-
mentalisation, national courts as well as courts established by international law
are invited to give effect to rules stemming from several, sectoral or compre-
hensive, regional or global, legal orders. In principle, these courts must com-
bine reserving for themselves the role of final arbiter of constitutionality within
their own order with due deference to the rules stemming from overlapping
legal orders. In such a legal construction, the traditional theories of monism
and dualism are clearly inadequate.
The case-law of the Court of Justice concerning the treatment of WTO law
must be viewed against this backdrop. The question posed to it invited the
Court to strike the correct balance between the fulfilment of the Community’s
obligations in the WTO and the preservation of its own autonomy. The Court
struck the current equilibrium on the basis of the terms of the WTO Agree-
ment rather than arbitrary political considerations. There is little support on
legal grounds for direct effect. On the contrary, the possibility of waiver from
substantive obligations and the facility of negotiated solutions, compensation
and suspension of concessions stemming from the DSU militate against such
effect. What the WTO Agreement as a whole clearly demonstrates is that it is
still rooted in traditional international law, its provisions striking a delicate
balance between rights and duties of states. Some exceptions created by the
Court should be treated as such and their scope should be duly safeguarded.
The balance between rules and exceptions should be deemed as upholding
rather than violating the rule of law for the reasons analysed above. The
recently ensuing rights discourse raises broader considerations relating to hu-
man rights protection in all interconnecting legal orders at a global level, the
101. Case of Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, (application no.
45036/98, preliminary objections), judgment of 30.06.2005.
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emphasis put on the Community legal order. In this respect, it seems that the
criticism mounted against the Court on the issue of direct effect is by and large
unjustified. This does not mean that a broader discussion on human rights
protection in the Community is undesirable; it only suggests that this is the
wrong platform.
Going beyond the legal analysis of the WTO Agreements, is the current
arrangement desirable in principle? At a time that remarkable steps towards
privatisation of international law have been taken it appears unjustified to
exclude the entities concerned par excellence with international trade, i.e. indi-
viduals, from the legal framework regulating it. Philosophically, such a devel-
opment would have the advantage of rationalising the relationship between
actors and process by recognising that in the field of international trade it is
essentially private interests involved. The downturn is that by relinquishing
control from the state the system is more open to abuse. Whatever happens
this should be a result of legislative intervention on a global scale rather than
judicial policy-making.
